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1. Introduction 
In modern companies, board of directors are in the center of corporate governance and 
supervision of executive management. Board of directors has been the response to the widely 
discussed agency problems. They could be seen as the middleman between shareholders, 
bondholders and executive management. Good corporate governance should help companies to 
overcome agency problems and affect firm performance in a positive manner. One main question 
about corporate governance is what the optimal composition of the board of directors is. In this 
paper, I examine the relationship between board composition and firm performance using a 
unique dataset of Nordic firms from 2012 to 2018.  
1.1 Background and motivation 
A number of previous studies have examined how different corporate governance variables affect 
the performance of the company1. There is a large amount of literature on many aspects of the 
board of directors and the attributes of boards. Most of the previous literature is based on time 
series before the 21st century and they are mainly US-based. Technology and corporate 
governance have developed substantially compared to the time before the 21st century. Also, 
corporate governance practices differ a lot between countries and regions. None of the studies 
found on top journals uses data from Nordic companies in post-financial crisis economy.  
1.2 Contribution to existing literature  
In this paper, I contribute to the mainly US-based literature examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance with a unique sample of Nordic Large and Mid cap2 
firms on post-financial markets. My dataset consists of 1,998 firm-year observations of many 
different variables. By including a broad panel dataset, I allow myself to use relevant econometric 
methods to control for endogeneity and ensure that my results are less likely to be biased by a 
specific time period. As the previous literature has been mostly from the dataset before the 21st 
century, my paper will offer knowledge if the relationship between composition of board of 
directors and firm performance still exists. 
1.3 Main findings 
My main findings are the following: I find strong evidence of a negative relationship between 
Board size and Tobin’s Q.  This main result proves robust to many different regression models. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Pfeffer, 1972; Yermack, 1996; Mak & Li, 2001; Bonn et al., 2004; Wintoki et al., 2009; Guest, 2009 
2 Nordic Large and Mid Cap consists of firms with a market value over MEUR 150 
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On the other hand, I find weak significance between the amount of foreign directors and Tobin’s 
Q. The relationship between the amount of foreign directors and Tobin’s Q is positive. I also 
employ ROA as another dependent variable. The relationship with Board size and ROA is 
negative but I find only weak significance. I do not find any significance between the amount of 
foreign directors and ROA. I use pooled OLS estimator and apply fixed effects model to control 
for omitted variable bias and endogeneity. My findings imply that optimal Board size is as low 
as possible measured with Tobin’s Q or ROA. I also find that the negative relationship between 
board size and performance is stronger with large firms who have larger boards. 
1.4 Limitations of this study 
As I am using pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators in this study, it will create some 
limitations. OLS and fixed effects will perform poorly if there are excessive outliers. To control 
for outliers I have winsorized my data and used additional regressions for robustness checks. 
Both of my regressions are linear and most of the systems, in reality, are not linear. In this study, 
I try to avoid this problem by using natural logarithms of certain variables. The least-squares 
method will also lead to unacceptable results if the used variables are highly correlated with each 
other. I will compute a pairwise correlation matrix and analyze the correlations to see if the 
variables that I choose are the correct ones. Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) also show that OLS 
and fixed effects regressions do not control for all types of endogeneity in corporate governance 
studies and dynamic models should be used. Based on the previous literature by Guest (2009) 
and Ammann, Oesch & Schmid (2011), I will assume that my models are not driven by dynamic 
endogeneity and use static regression models in my main analysis. I will also employ a dynamic 
GMM estimator as robustness check. 
1.5 Structure of this study 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I review the literature on board of directors’ operation 
and structure, as well as the relationship between board composition & firm performance and 
construct my hypothesis based on the previous literature. In section 3 I describe the data I have 
used in this study and section 4 reviews the methodology applied with my data. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results from my main analysis and section 6 will offer additional analysis as well 
as robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the study. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Literature review 
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2.1.1. Function of corporate board 
Board of directors has been a largely researched topic in corporate finance studies as they have a 
central role in a corporation. Corporate governance practices may vary a lot between countries 
based on many different factors, like the nature of the financial markets, the time of the 
definitions, corporate culture and the theory used to characterize such practices (Kaczmarek, 
Kimino & Pye, 2012). As Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2007) say in their paper: “The board of 
directors of a corporation is meant to perform the critical functions of monitoring and advising 
top management.”, beside the fact that the board is monitoring the top management of corporation 
is functioning as it should, board’s role is also to make major decisions affecting the company’s 
future performance and advise the top management in its actions. 
In the Nordic countries, corporate governance includes high governance ratings and minimum 
levels of corruption. There is a clear difference between a board of directors and executive 
management which is also described as a two-tier governance model. On the other hand, board 
of directors in Nordics is not limited to the supervision and can interfere in a company’s actions.  
(Thomsen, 2016) This differs from the U.S. or U.K. usual one-tier model. In Nordics, the amount 
of independent directors is much higher compared to the U.S. or U.K. (Oxelheim, Gregorič & 
Randøy, 2013). These high differences between corporate governance practices increase the 
motivation to study board of directors in different geographical areas. 
The majority of research studying board of directors and the functions they have is examining 
the relationship between board-specific characteristics and company performance. The 
explaining variable is usually some board-specific character for example board independence, 
board size, board diversity or board ownership and the dependent variable is usually some 
market-based or accounting-based variable, for example, Tobin’s Q, return on equity, return on 
assets or market return.3 
2.1.2. Board size and performance 
The relationship between board size and firm performance have had mixed outcomes. Yermack 
(1996) found evidence that board size has a negative impact on the performance of the company. 
He used OLS and fixed effects regressions to estimate optimal size for board measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) have found similar results as Yermack (1996). 
They studied the relationship between board size and financial performance in small and midsize 
                                                 
3 See Yermack (1996), Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2007), Guest (2009) and Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) 
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Finnish firms and found as well negative relation between board size and firm performance using 
industry-adjusted return on assets. They both conclude the problem to derive from the fact that 
the problems of communication and decision making increase as the board size increases. This 
affects the ability of the board to control management and by that leading to agency problems 
arising from the disengagement of management and control. 
At the start of the century, Mak & Yuanto (2003) also found a negative relationship between 
board size and firm performance by using data of Singapore and Malaysian firms. Guest (2009) 
also provided results of a negative relation between board size and firm performance on U.K. 
based firms. 
Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008) found that the relationship between firm value and board size is 
U-shaped, suggesting that either very small or very large boards are optimal. They showed that 
the relation arose from differences between complex and simple firms. Based on their findings, 
for complex firms, larger board size would optimal and for simple firms, smaller board size would 
be optimal.  
On the contrary, there is also a broad amount of literature that has found a positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance. For example, Fayzi & Locke (2012) found a positive 
relation to New Zealand’s listed firms. Also, Boone, Field, Karpoff & Raheja (2007) showed a 
positive relation between board size and performance. Most of the studies argue that the more we 
have directors the more information we have on the board and therefore they will come up with 
more robust solutions to major decisions. 
The debate on what is the effect of board size on firm performance is still ongoing and new 
research on corporate governance comes on a rapid basis. The majority of the studies that imply 
significance between board size and performance suggest a negative relationship. 
2.1.3. Foreign directors and performance 
The amount of foreign directors on corporate boards is not as a research topic as the board size 
itself. Masulis, Wang & Xie (2012) show that U.S. based firms with foreign independent directors 
make better cross-border acquisitions when the target company is from the director’s home 
region. On the other hand, they show that firms with foreign directors suffer from a poorer 
performance. Choi, Sul & Min (2012) also found positive relations between foreign directors and 
firm value in Korean firms.  
In the Nordics, board rooms seem to be surprisingly homogenous in terms of nationality. Randøy, 
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Thomsen & Oxelheim (2006) did not found any significance between board diversity and firm 
performance in terms of nationality while using data from Nordics. They also state that greater 
board diversity did not come in the cost of lower performance. Hahn & Lasfer (2016) found on 
U.K. firms that foreign non-executive directors do add value when the meeting frequency of a 
firm is high. Most of the studies on the diversity of nationality on board have not found any 
significance and those who have found are contradictory with each other.  
2.1.4. Problem of endogeneity in corporate governance studies 
The problem of endogeneity in corporate governance studies has been a largely discussed topic. 
As Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) show in their paper, empirical corporate governance research 
often has a large number of issues with endogeneity. They see that there are three types of 
endogeneity in corporate governance studies: 1. Dynamic endogeneity 2. Simultaneity 3. 
Unobserved heterogeneity. They also point out that widely used instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions are not valid for corporate governance studies as there are hardly any strictly 
exogenous variables that would correlate with independent variables but not with the dependent 
variable. Also Stock & Yogo (2002) show in their paper that using invalid instruments in IV 
regressions will result in biased estimators for the model. Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) suggest 
using well developed dynamic generalized methods of moments to control for all types of 
endogeneity. 
Guest (2009) employed suggested methods by Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012)4 and many other 
authors and studied the relationship using both instrumental variable analysis and generalized 
methods of moments. His findings show that the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance is not driven by unobserved firm effects, simultaneous endogeneity or dynamic 
endogeneity as Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) suggested. He also shows that the variables 
widely used for instrumental variables analysis are endogenous and invalid. Based on his 
findings, the use of IV regressions in corporate governance research will result in biased results. 
Also, Ammann, Oesch & Schmid (2011) studied the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm value from 22 developed countries over the period from 2003 to 2007. By using a 
dynamic GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998), 
they found a significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. These 
findings ease the endogeneity concerns in corporate governance studies. 
                                                 
4 Wintoki, Linck & Netter had published a previous version of this article already in 2007 so Guest (2009) had 
the change to use the methods. 
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2.2. Hypothesis 
This section will go through the research question and hypotheses of this thesis. Board of 
directors' characteristics and firm performance is a largely studied topic of corporate governance 
study, but most of the studies are based on UK or U.S. firms and the period is before the 21st 
century. None have addressed the relationship between the board of directors and firm 
performance in Nordic countries and the time period being after 2010. Due to these 
considerations, I will study the relationship between the size of board of directors and firm 
performance, using several different regression models on a unique data set of Nordic companies. 
In a study, Zahra & Pearce (1989) divided board attributes into four broader categories. In this 
study, I have also used the model from Zahra & Pearce (1989) and divided board attributes as 
shown in Table 1. In this paper, I will focus on the effect of composition of a board of directors. 
I will construct hypotheses about board composition using board size and amount of foreign 
directors. 
 
2.2.1. Board Size 
The previous literature reviewed above has not been consistent on the question does board size 
has a positive or negative effect on firm performance. The consensus has still been that board 
size has a negative effect on firm performance, as Yermack (1996), Wu (2000), Guest (2009) and 
Kumar & Singh (2013) suggest. This is mostly due to the assumption that firm value depends on 
the quality and efficiency of decision-making and monitoring by the board of directors. Smaller 
groups can be more effective and, as Guest (2009) mentions, larger boards are usually related to 
free-rider problems and higher coordination costs. Based on this, the first hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
H1: Number of board of directors is negatively correlated with firm performance. 
2.2.2. Amount of foreign directors 
Following the past literature discussed above, the proportion of foreign directors could have 
either a positive or negative effect on the performance of a firm. The past literature has not found 
high consistent significance between board diversity and firm performance from the perspective 
of foreign directors. Based on this, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H2: Amount of foreign directors do not have significant effect on firm performance. 
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Table 1 
Board attributes divided into categories. This table reports board attributes I use in my regressions. These 
categories were first introduced by Zahra & Pearce (1989). 
Category Variable 
Composition Board size, Amount of foreign board members 
Characteristics Board Independence 
Structure Board ownership 
Process Board meeting activity, Audit committee meeting activity 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. Sample construction 
The source for my sample of Nordic publicly traded firms for governance variables is an external 
provider and for financial variables, the source is Datastream, from which financial variables are 
derived. The external provider is a consulting firm specialized in corporate governance in Nordics 
called Alexander Incentives5. They have a large database of executive compensation metrics and 
governance variables from Nordic Countries.  
From Alexander Incentives database, I start out with 21,432 person-year observations of many 
different variables. I constructed my dataset so that I have only firm-year observations from all 
variables. I restricted my sample of firms to Danish, Swedish and Finnish companies as the 
sample of Norwegian firms was lacking information. I also restricted my sample of firms to Large 
and Mid Cap companies as the sample from governance variables had mainly Small Cap 
companies from Finland included. Another reason for excluding Small Cap companies is that 
corporate governance in Small Cap companies varies a lot compared to larger companies, as 
                                                 
5 Alexander Incentives is a Finnish consultancy specialized in executive compensation and corporate 
governance surveys in Nordics. 
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Aaboen, Lindelöf, von Koch & Löfsten (2006) and Linck, Netter & Yang (2008) showed.  I base 
my empirical analysis from 2012 onwards. 
A study by Elton, Gruber, & Blake (1996) shows that survivorship bias can lead to overly 
optimistic results because failures are ignored. I have included all firms that have been delisted 
due to acquisition or bankruptcy during the time period. I have checked all of the active firms on 
a yearly basis. Because of this the sample will not have a survivorship bias and does not exclude 
companies that performed the worse during the period. My final sample consists of a panel of 
1,998 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2018. Table 2 is the presentation of summary statistics 
for all the variables used in the regression analysis. 
 
3.2. Dependent and independent variables 
Based on the methods of related studies, such as Barnhart et al. (1994), Yermack (1996), Mak & 
Li (2001) and Coles et al. (2008), I will use a market-based variable as well as accounting-based 
variable as the dependent variable. My key dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q (1) is 
determined as the ratio of a firm’s market value divided by the replacement cost of assets. I have 
calculated Tobin’s Q in this study as follows. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝐵𝑉𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑡
    (1)  
where  𝐵𝑉𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of total debt on year t for firm i 
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the market value of common equity on year t for firm i 
𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of on year t assets for firm i 
Boone, Field, Karpoff & Raheja (2007), Linck, Netter & Yang (2008), and Lehn, Patro & Zhao 
(2008) provide empirical evidence on why Tobin’s Q can be a problem as a measure of firm 
performance. Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) argue that “Tobin’s Q is a proxy for growth 
opportunities, and growth opportunities are a cause, rather than a consequence, of governance 
structures.”  
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Table 2 
Sample summary statistics. This table report sample summary statistics for 1,998 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2018. 
Companies are from Finland, Sweden or Denmark. Sample includes only data from Large and Mid Cap companies. All of 
the governance variables are gathered from Alexander Incentive’s large database. All of the financial variables are gathered 
from the Datastream. Tobin’s Q is calculated using the Eq. 1 and ROA is calculated using the Eq.2. Board size is the number 
of directors chosen by annual general meeting. %-Foreign directors is calculated by dividing number of foreign directors 
by total number of directors. Board meetings is total number of board meetings per fiscal year. Committee meetings is total 
number of committee meetings per fiscal year. %-Board ownership is the total amount of ownership that board members 
have of the company presented as a percentage of the total market value of equity. %-Board independence is the percentage 
amount of directors that are independent of the company. Size is the market value of a company. Debt is the sum of long-
term debt, short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt, divided by total capital, short-term debt and preference 
capital. Capex is capital expenditures divided by total sales. 
 
Variable n Mean St. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
                  
         
Measures of performance         
Tobin's Q 1,998 1.57 1.99 0.05 0.53 0.95 1.74 11.61 
ROA 1,998 0.06 0.09 -0.3 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.39 
         
Governance Variables         
Board Size 1,998 7.04 1.49 4 6 7 8 11 
%-Foreign directors 1,998 22 26 0 0 14 32 100 
Board Meetings 1,998 11.63 4.59 5 9 11 14 29.03 
Committee Meetings 1,998 8.64 5.9 0 5 8 11 29 
%-Board Ownership 1,886 10 16 0 0 1 13 67 
%-Board independence 1,783 84 18 21 75 88 100 100 
         
Company characteristics         
Size (MEUR) 1,998 3,677.53 7,276.73 104.4 382.96 927.38 3,058.27 43,429.8 
Debt 1,998 0.36 0.21 0 0.2 0.36 0.48 0.92 
Capex 1,998 0.12 0.32 0 0.02 0.03 0.05 1.88 
         
                  
In addition to Tobin’s Q, in this study, I use another performance measure as the dependent 
variable for robustness. Yermack’s (1996) study notes that his findings of board size and firm 
value are mirrored in firm profitability. I use return on assets (ROA) (2) to measure firm 
performance. I have calculated ROA in this study as follows. 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (2)  
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As independent variables, I use governance variables that represent attributes of boards of 
directors presented in Table 1. My key independent variable is board size. In my sample, I have 
only included directors chosen by the annual general meeting and excluded all other directors for 
example employee representative. This is because, in Nordic corporate governance, employee 
representatives do not have the same authority as members chosen by the annual general meeting. 
In the study, I have used the natural logarithm of the total number of directors. Fig. 1 illustrates 
the mean and median values of Tobin’s Q for companies sorted by board size. The median and 
mean of Tobin’s Q values decline almost monotonically over the scope of board sizes. The 
median Tobin’s Q only increases when changing from 5 to 6 directors. For companies with seven 
or fewer directors, mean Tobin’s Q value is above 1.5. For companies with over 7 directors, the 
mean Tobin’s Q value is below 1.5. 
Following the related literature, Yermack (1996), Mak & Li (2001), Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2008) and Vafeas & Vlittis (2019), I use another governance variables as the independent 
variable for explaining the performance of firms. As another measure of board attributes, I use 
Foreign directors. A foreign director is someone whose nationality is different from the 
companies’ country of main exchange. The Foreign directors is calculated by dividing a number 
of foreign directors by the total number of directors. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
Following previous literature, such as Yermack (1996), Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008) and 
Guest (2009), I will include several firm- and board-specific characteristics that may correlate 
with company’s performance as control variables. As discussed in the 2. section I use variables 
from different categories of board attributes. To control for the process of the board of directors 
I use Board meetings and Committee meetings as control variables. Board meetings is the total 
number of board meetings per company in a fiscal year. Committee meetings is the total number 
of committee meetings per company in a fiscal year. To further control for board composition 
and characteristics I use Board ownership and Board independence. Board ownership is the total 
amount of ownership that board members have of the company presented as a percentage of the 
total market value of equity. Board independence is measured by dividing the number of 
independent directors by the total number of board of directors. In this study, the independent 
directors are independent of the company but might not be independent of the major shareholders. 
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This means that independent directors are not employed by the company but might be a major 
shareholder. 
Figure 1. 
Board Size and Tobin’s Q: Sample means and medians. The sample consist of 1,998 firm-year observations 
from 2012 to 2018. Data for Board size is provided by external provider, Alexander Incentives. Data for Tobin’s 
Q is gathered from the datastream. Tobin’s Q is calculated as Market value of assets divided by replacement 
cost of assets. 
 
 
As the past literature, I also control for many company characteristics. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity. Controlling for the capital structure of the company is 
important as it has been shown in the past literature that it has an effect on firm value. Debt is the 
sum of long-term debt, short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt, divided by total 
capital, short-term debt and preference capital. ROA is used also as a control variable for 
regressions having Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Like Yermack (1996), I also use a lagged 
control variable 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2 to define that it usually takes time for performance to adjust 
to changes in operations and to reduce possible autocorrelation and omitted variable bias. 
According to past literature, as Yermack (1996), Hutchinson (2002) and Hutchinson & Gul 
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(2004), the firm value depends on future investment opportunities. I use Capex as a proxy for 
investment opportunities. Capex is capital expenditure divided by sales. I use it also as a control 
for growth. All variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles to remove influential 
outliers. 
Additionally, as Yermack (1996), Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008), Guest (2009) and Masulis, 
Wnag & Xie (2012), I control for year and industry fixed effects. Controlling for industry fixed 
effects is specifically important as Tobin’s Q and ROA vary a lot between industries and across 
time. Information about the industries is gathered using two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) codes. I have constructed a specific factor for every industry per year. This means 
I have 126 different Industry-Year groups. With this factor, I can control for some industries that 
have performed poorly some specific year or outperformed other industries in some specific year. 
As the past literature, I also control for firm fixed effects. 
 
4. Methodology 
Following the past literature, as Yermack (1996), Guest (2009) and Ammann, Oesch & Schmid 
(2011), in my main analysis, I employ pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects 
linear models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. As I have unbalanced panel data, it 
is hard to satisfy all the assumptions of OLS. Therefore, fixed effects regression with firm and 
time fixed effects will be more robust concerning autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and omitted 
variable bias. As Guest (2009), I use t-statistics that are based on robust standard errors. The 
observations are clustered at the firm level. To further take account of multicollinearity in my 
regressions I compute a pairwise correlation matrix for my variables. The pairwise correlation 
matrix is shown in table 3.  
The pairwise correlations are fairly low but as expected, there is some amount of correlation 
between chosen explanatory variables. For example, there is a positive correlation between Board 
size and variables Size and Committee meetings. Overall, larger firms tend to have larger boards 
and larger boards often arrange their work into committee work, compared to small firms. This 
is shown as the Size has a negative correlation with Board meetings and a positive correlation 
with Committee meetings. There is also a negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and variables 
Debt, Board meetings, and Committee meetings. If the firm is facing troubles and the market 
value compared to assets decrease, board of directors tends to convene more often. 
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As Mansfield & Helms (1982) study shows, multicollinearity can reduce the efficiency of the 
multiple regression analysis. I also create variance inflation factors6 (VIFs) for my explanatory 
variables shown in table 4. The VIFs are calculated as follows:   
    𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑗 =
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑗)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑗0)
=
1
1−𝑅𝑗
2   (3)  
Table 4 
Variance inflation factors table. This table reports calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIFs are calculated with Eq. 
3. All of the VIFs are less than 5 which implies that there is no problematic multicollinearity. 
Variable 
  
VIF 
  
ln Board Size 1.242 
ln Size 1.322 
Debt 1.148 
Capex 1.191 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 1.426 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 1.580 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2 1.368 
Board meetings 1.107 
Committee meetings 1.271 
Foreign Directors 1.002 
Board ownership 1.112 
Board independence 1.050 
  
As all of the VIFs are less than 2, I can continue my analysis without further actions. For my 
main analysis, I use several different models for the two dependent variables. The empirical 
models are in the form of the following. 
Performance = f(board structure, firm characteristics, fixed effects), 
Following the previous literature, as Yermack (1996), Wintoki (2007) and Guest (2009), 
regressions that I use in this study build on the following basis. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠) +  𝛽2 ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) +  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2 +  𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 +
 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +
 𝛽11𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑥 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)  +  𝜀    (4)  
                                                 
6 Variance inflation factor calculates how much the variance of a predicted regression coefficient is affected by 
collinearity. VIF 1 being low and >5 being high. 
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Based on my hypotheses, 𝛽1 should be negative and 𝛽9 should be positive. 
At first, I study the relationship between Board members and Tobin’s Q by using models A1 - 
A6 shown in table 5. Within the models, I use industry x year dummies7 to control for effects 
between industries and between years. Regressions A1 – A4 are all pooled OLS regressions. 
Regression A1 regress ln Board members to Tobin’s Q while controlling for firm characteristics 
and board process (see section 2.) but not for board composition or characteristics. Regressions 
A2 - A4 regress ln Board members to Tobin’s Q while controlling for all control variables. I omit 
Committee meetings as a control variable from regression A3 for robustness checks. A5 – A6 are 
fixed effects regressions with firm fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for omitted 
variable bias meaning unrecognized firm characteristics, unrecognized heterogeneity between 
years and endogeneity. 
The effect of Board size to ROA is estimated using regression models B1 to B5 shown in table 6. 
B1 – B3 are pooled OLS estimators. All of them control for industry-year dummies, firm-specific 
variables, and board process variables. B4 - B5 are fixed effects regression controlling for firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. I omit lagged values of ROA in A1 regression to see if there 
is autocorrelation in the model. All of these regressions are shown and analyzed in section 5. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Table 5 reports the results of regression between Board size and Tobin’s Q. A1 – A4 are Pooled 
OLS regressions and A5 – A6 are fixed effects regression with firm and year fixed effects. As 
mentioned, all of the models are build using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. My H1 
was that “: Number of board of directors is negatively correlated with firm performance”. All of 
the estimated beta coefficients for Board size shown in table 5 suggest a negative relationship 
between Board size and firm performance at a 1% significance level. The coefficients range from 
-0.874 to -0.462. The model with the largest amount of controlling (A7) yields a beta coefficient 
of -0.576. Calculated with A7 model’s beta coefficient, as median market capitalization8  in my 
 
                                                 
7 IY Dummies = Industry x Year dummy is constructed by creating separate code for every industry per year. 
As I have 18 industries and 7 years, it means that I have 126 separate Industry-Year groups.  
8 See table 2 
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Table 5 
Pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions results, effect of Board size and Foreign directors to Tobin’s Q. This table reports 
regressions results for models A1 – A6. Regression A1 and A5 regress ln Board members to ln Tobin’s Q while controlling 
for firm characteristics and board process (see section 2.) but not for board composition or characteristics. Regressions A2 
- A4 and A6 regress ln Board members and Foreign directors to Tobin’s Q while controlling for all control variables. 
Committee meetings is omitted in A3. Models A5 and A6 are fixed effects regressions. T-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors in which observations are clustered at firm level. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. 
 
Dependent variable: ln Tobin's Q
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
ln Board size -0.652
***
-0.731
***
-0.815
***
-0.607
***
-0.462
***
-0.576
***
(0.140) (0.128) (0.110) (0.153) (0.176) (0.185)
Foreign directors 0.477
*** 0.110 0.162 0.335
**
(0.089) (0.076) (0.102) (0.163)
ln Size 0.124
***
0.098
***
0.090
***
0.129
***
0.138
***
0.160
***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.035) (0.040)
Debt -1.402
***
-1.944
***
-1.516
***
-1.464
***
-1.371
***
-1.536
***
(0.152) (0.146) (0.119) (0.161) (0.201) (0.219)
Capex 0.297
***
-0.197
***
0.431
***
0.306
***
0.386
***
0.374
***
(0.082) (0.073) (0.059) (0.083) (0.095) (0.098)
1.622
***
1.320
***
1.612
***
1.461
***
1.446
***
1.144
***
(0.346) (0.430) (0.382) (0.360) (0.348) (0.344)
1.403
***
1.083
**
1.533
***
1.408
***
1.170
***
1.206
***
(0.310) (0.424) (0.396) (0.331) (0.325) (0.325)
0.099 0.296 -0.087 -0.107 0.211 -0.118
(0.332) (0.403) (0.355) (0.364) (0.339) (0.354)
Board meetings -0.010
*
-0.014
**
-0.016
*** -0.009 -0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Committee meetings -0.029
***
-0.036
***
-0.030
***
-0.025
***
-0.029
***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Board ownership -0.302
**
0.232
** 0.012 0.090
(0.133) (0.106) (0.141) (0.160)
Board independence 0.328
**
0.216
* 0.238 0.085
(0.137) (0.113) (0.147) (0.148)
Constant 0.458 1.339
***
0.673
*** 0.125
(0.280) (0.233) (0.234) (0.304)
IY Dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,998 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,998 1,682
R
2 0.616 0.386 0.583 0.600 0.500 0.485
Adjusted R
2 0.600 0.382 0.565 0.583 0.328 0.269
Note: *p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Fixed 
effects
Fixed 
effects
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2
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sample size is MEUR 927.38 and median board size9 is 7, if we add one director to the board 
(ceteris paribus) it will decrease our market capitalization by MEUR 68.65. 
These findings support my H1 hypothesis and I can reject the null hypothesis that Board size 
does not have any significant effect on firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. These findings 
also support the findings by the previous literature that Board size has a negative relationship 
with Tobin’s Q. 
My H2 was that “Amount of foreign directors do not have significant effect on firm performance”. 
The results from models A2 and A6 are not totally consistent with the hypothesis. Two out of 
four models using foreign members as an independent variable, found significance and positive 
correlation between foreign members and Tobin’s Q.  However, there are things to consider about 
these findings. As seen on the table, there is no significant relationship in models A3 and A4. 
Also, the significance in model A6 is lower (at a 5% confidence level). Most of the coefficients 
of my control variables are also significant at a 1% level.  
As all the regressions show, the high statistical negative significance between committee 
meetings and Tobin’s Q could be explained by the fact that low performing firms’ board of 
directors will convene more often. Especially if the firm is about to face bankruptcy. One 
interesting finding is Debt ratio has a high negative significant effect on Tobin’s Q. This supports 
the findings of Yazdanfar & Öhman (2015), that a higher debt ratio affects firm value negatively. 
This is also consistent with the pecking order theory, as Myers (1984) shows in his paper. Also 
as discussed in section 3 while choosing control variables, Capex is a proxy for growth and 
investment opportunities and as covered in section 2, investment opportunities have a positive 
effect on firm value. All the regressions A1 – A6 suggests that the more we have investment 
opportunities (capital expenditure compared to sales) the higher our Tobin’s Q is. 
On the contrary, when estimating with ROA as the dependent variable, I find no significance 
between Board size and ROA. As the results in table 6 show, all the significance disappears when 
I add lagged values of ROA to the equation. This suggests autocorrelation as the dependent 
variable is highly correlated with its lagged values. Only the model B1 supports my H1 as it 
shows negative significance at a 5% confidence level. These findings do not support my H1 or 
H2 and I cannot if measured by ROA. 
 
                                                 
9 See table 2 
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Table 6 
Pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions results, effect of Board size and Foreign directors to ROA. This table reports 
regressions results for models B1 – B5. B1 – B3 are pooled OLS estimators. All of them control for industry-year dummies, 
firm-specific variables and board process variables. B3 and B5 control also for board composition or characteristics. B4 - 
B5 are fixed effects regression controlling for firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. Lagged values of ROA are omitted 
in A1 regression to see if there is autocorrelation in the model. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors in which 
observations are clustered at firm level. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
Dependent variable: ROA
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed effects Fixed effects
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
ln Board size -0.039
** -0.009 -0.010 -0.023 -0.024
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017)
Foreign directors 0.009 -0.005
(0.006) (0.015)
Size 0.022
***
0.008
***
0.008
***
0.016
***
0.017
***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Debt -0.085
***
-0.022
* -0.019 -0.053
***
-0.055
**
(0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.022)
Capex -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 -0.012
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
0.509
***
0.560
***
0.351
***
0.375
***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.056) (0.065)
0.217
***
0.175
***
0.144
***
0.121
**
(0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.052)
Board meetings -0.001 -0.0002 -0.00002 0.0001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001)
Committee meetings -0.003
***
-0.001
***
-0.001
**
-0.001
***
-0.001
*
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Board ownership 0.004 0.027
*
(0.010) (0.014)
Board independence 0.003 -0.020
(0.009) (0.020)
Constant -0.007 -0.037
*
-0.043
*
(0.032) (0.022) (0.024)
IY Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,998 1,998 1,682 1,998 1,682
R
2 0.180 0.520 0.528 0.318 0.315
Adjusted R
2 0.148 0.501 0.508 0.303 0.278
Note: *p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2
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ROA and Tobin’s Q are different metrics and therefore my findings and the data suggest that 
Board size has a negative effect on firm value but not on operating profitability. It also suggests 
that the amount of foreign directors has some positive effect on firm value but not on operating 
profitability. 
 
6. Further analysis and robustness checks 
I check if my findings of a negative relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q are robust by 
employing a variety of other different regressions. These robustness checks provide additional 
information on how my conclusions change when methods and assumptions change. 
 
6.1. Precise specification for the relationship between board composition and performance 
As Guest (2009), to further examine the relationship between Board size and firm performance I 
have included dummy variables for each number of board of directors while controlling with all 
control variables mentioned in section 3. The results are shown in appendix 1. The results suggest 
that the smallest possible size for board of directors is the best as the beta coefficients for 5 
members is the largest. This effect is present measured either by Tobin’s Q or ROA. When 
measured by Tobin’s Q, the larger the board size is the more significant the coefficient is. When 
measured by ROA, the smaller the board size is, the more significant the coefficient is. These 
results support findings made by main OLS and fixed effects regressions. 
I also divided the amount of foreign directors to 5 different groups and constructed dummy 
variables for each group as shown in appendix 1. I found significant negative relationship 
between a low and high amount of foreign directors and Tobin’s Q. As my main findings, I found 
no relationship between foreign directors and ROA. If the amount of foreign directors is between 
0% and 20%, the negative relation is significant at a 1% level. If the amount is between 20% and 
40% the negative relation is significant at a 5% level and if the amount is between 80% and 100% 
the positive relation is significant at a 10% level. These results also support findings made in the 
main analysis by OLS and fixed effects regressions. 
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6.2. Relationship between board size and performance differs by firm characteristics. 
According to the previous literature by Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008), the impact of board size 
is different with different types of firms. They argue that for firms that are aged, large and have 
a high debt ratio, larger board size would be the optimal choice. On the contrary, for complex 
firms with high R&D and high variance in profitability, small board size may be the right choice. 
I will employ similar methods as Coles, Daniel & Naveen and Guest (2009), and test the relation 
with interactive variables between board size and each firm-specific control variable. The results 
are shown in appendix 2. 
Board size * Size coefficient is significant, measured either with Tobin’s Q or ROA. I find no 
significance in other coefficients. As the Board size * Size coefficient is significantly negative, 
my data suggests that board size has a larger negative impact on performance in large firms that 
it has in small firms. This means that large firms could improve performance more than small 
firms by limiting the number of directors as low as reasonable. I also regressed performance on 
the amount of foreign directors with interactive variables while controlling for the characteristics 
mentioned above and found no evidence of a relationship. 
 
6.3. Measurement errors and multicollinearity 
Following the previous literature, as Guest (2009), in order to further control for outliers, I 
employ a quantile regression models (Regression E2 and E3 in table appendix 3) which yields an 
estimate of −0.547 for the board size coefficient (significant at the 1% level) measured by Tobin’s 
Q and an estimate of -0,004 (significant at the 5% level) measured by ROA. This shows that my 
model is not affected by endogeneity generated by measurement errors. 
I also include regression without Committee meetings (A3, E1, E3) as it is relatively highly 
correlated with many independent variables and the dependent variable. As regressions E1 and 
E3 show, omitting Committee meetings will slightly increase the effect of Board size in both 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
 
6.4. Possible dynamic endogeneity in corporate governance 
As mentioned in chapter 2, a large concern discussed in studies by Coles, Daniel, & Naveen 
(2008), Guest (2009) and Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) is the endogeneity in corporate 
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governance studies. As I brought out in section 1, they argue that using only static models and 
ignoring the dynamic nature of performance relationship in empirical work presents significant 
concerns. 
Many studies have used instrumental variables regression to address this problem. As Wintoki, 
Linck & Netter (2012) points out, using instrumental variables (IV) regression is not very 
effective in corporate governance studies as finding instrumental variables that are strictly 
exogenous is really hard as there is barely any. 
As Guest (2009), Ammann, Oesch & Schmid (2011) and Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012), to 
control for all of the three types of endogeneity10 mentioned before, I follow the methods of 
Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) and use dynamic panel GMM estimator as recommended by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system GMM consists of the 
following steps: First, I compute the regression equation as a dynamic model that includes lagged 
performance as a control variable. Then, I estimate the model by GMM and use lagged values of 
governance and performance variables as instruments. Using the lagged values as instruments 
controls for reverse causality and simultaneity. I do an assumption in the GMM regression that 
all the other regressors except Capex and year dummies are endogenous. 
The results of this robustness check are aligned with my main findings. I find a significant 
negative relationship between Board size and Tobin’s Q and significant positive relationship 
between Foreign directors and Tobin’s Q. I also do not find any significance between my main 
independent variables and ROA. The test for second-order serial correlation in the first 
differenced residuals and the Hansen test both yield insignificant P-value which means that there 
is no serial correlation and the instruments set are valid. Based on these findings I can conclude 
that my results with Tobin’s Q are not driven by dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity 
or simultaneity. All results are shown in Appendix 4. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this thesis, using a unique sample of 1,998 firm-year observations on Nordic firms11 during 
2012 – 2018, I have analyzed the relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
Based on the previous literature I constructed my hypothesis that Board size has a negative effect 
                                                 
10 Dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity 
11 As mentioned in section 3, by Nordic firms I mean firms from Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
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on firm performance and the amount of foreign directors has no effects on firm performance. The 
null hypothesis being that board size has no effect on firm performance and the amount of foreign 
directors has a significant effect on firm performance. As a measure of performance, I have used 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value divided by replacement cost 
of assets and ROA is return on assets. As the previous literature, Tobin’s Q and ROA gives this 
study an adequate representation of firm value and profitability. 
By constructing numerous different regressions examining the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance while controlling for many firm-specific variables, 
governance variables, firm, industry and year fixed effects, I found significance relationship 
between Board size and Firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. I also find some significance between 
the amount of foreign directors and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. As examining the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance by firm characteristics, I find that 
the board size and firm value effect is more severe in larger firms.  In this study I employ pooled 
OLS estimator and fixed effects regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. With 
these models, I am able to control for anticipated board and company characteristics and capture 
the effects of unanticipated characteristics and macroeconomic phenomena. My findings of the 
relationship between board size and firm value are robust to foreseeable covariates, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and omitted variables. 
The results from this paper have many suggestions for practice and future research. In practice, my 
results suggest that companies should try to keep the board size as minimum as possible considering 
the size of the company. The bigger the company gets the higher the effect is. If the company already 
has a large board, they should recognize the inefficiency problems it creates and tries to improve the 
efficiency of decision making and communication. Boards should also consider choosing foreign 
directors to bring diversity and international experience but not on the cost of the number of board of 
directors. Added foreign directors should replace other director’s place on the board.  
To further examine reactions of the markets to the announcement of an increase in board size, an 
event study method could be applied to study abnormal returns around the yearly announcement of 
board size. This study also offers an opportunity for future research to study the effects of diversity 
on other parameters. Applying the same methodology future research could study the effect of gender 
or age diversity. Also, the methodology could be applied to other sets of data to see if a similar 
relationship can be found in other geographical areas, as the corporate governance practices differ a 
lot between countries. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1. 
 
Pooled OLS linear model regression results, effect of Board size and Foreign directors on Tobin’s Q and ROA. Models C1 
and C2 show the effect of Board size divided into factors. Models C3 and C4 shows the effects of Foreign directors divided 
into 5 different groups using dummy variables. D1 means values between 0-0.2. D2 means values between 0.2-0.4. D3 
means values between 0.4-0.6. D4 means values between 0.6-0.8. D5 means values between 0.8-1. All the models control 
for board related factors, firm specific factors and industry- & year- fixed effects that have been omitted from the table. 
Variables are defined in the table 2 above. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors in which observations are clustered 
at firm level. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: ln Tobin's Q ROA ln Tobin's Q ROA
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Board size 5 0.061 0.028
***
(0.114) (0.011)
Board size 6 -0.025 0.023
**
(0.108) (0.010)
Board size 7 -0.086 0.025
**
(0.109) (0.010)
Board size 8 -0.254
**
0.018
*
(0.112) (0.011)
Board size 9 -0.284
** 0.016
(0.122) (0.011)
Board size 10 -0.555
*** 0.015
(0.130) (0.012)
Board size 11 -0.602
*** -0.001
(0.154) (0.014)
Foreign members D1 -0.252
*** -0.005
(0.097) (0.009)
Foreign members D2 -0.263
** -0.011
(0.104) (0.010)
Foreign members D3 0.075 0.006
(0.059) (0.005)
Foreign members D4 0.086 0.008
(0.079) (0.007)
Foreign members D5 0.185
* -0.001
(0.099) (0.009)
Constant -0.807
***
-0.081
***
-0.379
*
-0.046
**
(0.209) (0.020) (0.204) (0.019)
Observations 1,998 1,998 1,998 1,998
R
2 0.610 0.524 0.601 0.521
Adjusted R
2 0.593 0.503 0.584 0.501
Note: *p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
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Appendix 2. 
 
Pooled OLS linear model regression results, effect of Board size and to Tobin’s Q and ROA using interactive variables 
between board size and each firm specific control variable. This table reports the results of two regressions made to further 
analyze if the impact of board size to firm performance will differ for different tyes of firms. All of the variables are described 
in the table 2. Both models control for board related factors, firm specific factors and industry- & year- fixed effects that 
have been omitted from the table. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors in which observations are clustered at firm 
level. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: ln Tobin's Q ROA
(D1) (D2)
ln Board size 1.044
**
0.144
***
(0.447) (0.034)
ln Size 0.664
***
0.049
***
(0.124) (0.009)
Debt -0.903 0.023
(0.856) (0.065)
Capex -1.805
*** 0.062
(0.604) (0.046)
2.273
***
0.512
***
(0.290) (0.022)
0.526
**
0.207
***
(0.266) (0.020)
ln Board size * ln Size -0.277
***
-0.021
***
(0.061) (0.005)
ln Board size * Debt -0.612 -0.024
(0.435) (0.033)
ln Board size * Capex 0.888
*** -0.035
(0.331) (0.025)
Constant -2.388
***
-0.312
***
(0.877) (0.066)
Observations 1,998 1,998
R
2 0.369 0.498
Adjusted R
2 0.366 0.495
Note: *p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2
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Appendix 3. 
 
Pooled OLS and quantile linear model regression results, effect of Board size and Foreign directors to Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
This table reports the results of two OLS regressions and two quantile regressions to test the robustness of my findings. All 
of the variables are described in the table 2. Models E1 and E3 are regressions omitting Committee meetings as control 
variable. Models E2 and E4 are quantile regressions using all control variables described in the table 2. All of the models 
industry- & year- fixed effects. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors in which observations are clustered at firm 
level. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:
Pooled OLS
Quantile 
regression
Pooled OLS
Quantile 
regression
(E1) (E2) (E3) (E4)
ln Board size -0.828
***
-0.547
***
-0.015
*
-0.004
**
(0.138) (0.090) (0.008) (0.002)
ln Size 0.086
***
0.081
***
0.007
***
0.001
***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.001) (0.0003)
Debt -1.472
***
-1.714
***
-0.025
***
-0.017
***
(0.156) (0.064) (0.008) (0.002)
Capex 0.412
***
-0.347
*** -0.003 0.002
(0.080) (0.047) (0.005) (0.002)
1.783
***
2.080
***
(0.346) (0.197)
1.491
***
2.004
***
0.514
***
0.693
***
(0.325) (0.204) (0.023) (0.005)
0.175 1.098
***
0.220
***
0.167
***
(0.350) (0.224) (0.021) (0.004)
Board meetings -0.017
***
-0.012
*** -0.0004 -0.00001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Committee meetings -0.029
*** -0.0001
(0.004) (0.0001)
Foreign members 0.297
*** -0.0004
(0.061) (0.001)
Board ownership -0.295
***
-0.003
*
(0.108) (0.002)
Board independence 0.208
* 0.002
(0.116) (0.002)
Constant 0.934
***
0.748
*** -0.021 0.014
***
(0.284) (0.202) (0.021) (0.004)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,998 1,682 1,998 1,682
R
2 0.599 0.518
Adjusted R
2 0.583 0.499
Note: *p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
ln Tobin's Q ROA
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2
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Appendix 4. 
 
Generalized methods of moments regression results, effect of Board size and Foreign directors to Tobin’s Q and ROA. This 
table reports results from GMM regressions measuring the effect of Board size and Foreign members on Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Variables are defined in the table 2 above. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors in which observations are 
clustered at firm level. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. AR(2) is test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. Hansen test of 
exogeneity is under the null hypothesis that instruments used in the GMM are valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: ln Tobin's Q ROA
GMM GMM
(F1) (F2)
ln Board size -0.925
** -0.007
(0.457) (0.033)
ln Size 0.059 0.012**
(0.054) (0.005)
Debt -2.453
***
-0.036
**
(0.389) (0.020)
Capex -0.089 -0.006
(0.118) (0.006)
1.892
*
(1.144)
1.143 0.401
***
(0.779) (0.110)
0.574 0.156
(0.568) (0.103)
Board meetings -0.020 -0.0004
(0.019) (0.001)
Committee meetings -0.039*** -0.002***
(0.013) (0.001)
Foreign members 1.162*** 0.015
(0.285) (0.015)
Board ownership -1.176** 0.027
(0.562) (0.029)
Board independence -0.046 -0.034
(0.400) (0.029)
Constant 2.434*** -0.011
(0.828) (0.048)
Observations 1,998 1,998
AR(2) 0.909 0.959
The Hansen test 0.289 0.602
Note: *p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2
